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This paper examines, from the perspective of the pay-performance connection, the
guideline principles recently issued by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) in
connection with the operation of share-based incentive schemes.  The four main
dimensions to these guidelines concern: (i) phasing of issue by use of regular awards; (ii)
setting of performance criteria (hurdles) against a peer group or bench-mark; (iii)
restricting any re-testing of satisfaction of such performance criteria; and (iv) instituting a
sliding scale of reward contingent on the performance out-turn against criteria.  Emphasis
is also placed on the accounting recognition challenge of reporting to shareholders the
expected value of such rewards.  Results are derived from a simulation over a 14 year
period of the implementation of such guidelines in a sample of companies traded on the
London Stock Exchange.  Empirical results suggest that the pay-performance connection
is not always made stronger by setting the hurdle ever higher, and that higher hurdles are
best tempered by generosity in terms of re-testing and re-issue of options.  The saving of
expense on such packages may be bought at the expense of a weakened pay-performance
connection at board level.
                                                          
1 The author would like to thank Paul Draper and Guy Jubb for helpful comments and advice in the
preparation of this paper.  Remaining errors are my own.
1. Introduction
Since the passage of the Finance Act 1984, Executive Share Options (ESOs) have
become an increasingly important component of executive remuneration.  In addition to
the tax advantages initially available by satisfying some relatively mild conditions, this
means of remuneration continues to hold out the possibility of achieving a clear link
between the executive’s pay and company performance.  From the initial outbreak of
enthusiasm for this means of executive remuneration, the prospect of equity dilution
through over zealous use of such schemes prompted institutional shareholders to take an
interest.  In particular, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) has, through the
promulgation and dissemination of various codes of practice2, emerged as the lead
organisation in the regulation of these share-based incentive schemes.
The most recent set of consolidated ABI guidelines was issued in March 2001 and comes
after a prolonged process of external scrutiny of top executive pay practices and
procedures.  A process which through the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), and
Hampel (1998) reports can best be described as self-regulation3, although the recent
proposal for the reform of company law in this area4 represents a rare government
intervention.  One consequence of these various reports, and the Greenbury Report in
particular,  was to move companies away from ESOs towards more complex Long Term
Incentive Plans (Ltips)5.  Nevertheless, ESOs remain empirically important and continue
to provide a standard against which other incentive pay schemes may be judged.
The new ABI (2001) guidelines mark a fairly radical departure from what has gone
before.  The detail of the development of these guidelines and the way in which they
provide guidance to boards and remuneration committees is provided below but, in
essence, the novelty comprises a move away from using the ‘four-times-emoluments’
guide as to a ceiling for option issue towards encouraging a ‘phasing’ of ESO issue in a
regular manner in preference to having a somewhat lumpy issue once every three or four
years.  Markedly more emphasis is now placed on setting challenging performance
criteria (or ‘hurdles’) before the ESOs vest, and performance is to be on a relative basis,
using peer groups or performance bench marks.  One version of a challenging
performance criterion mentioned but not specifically required in the ABI guidelines, and
certainly commonly touted in the business press, is the issue of executive share options
with a strike price that is at a ‘premium’ to the market price.  This alternative will also be
examined below.
                                                          
2 See, for example, Association of British Insurers (1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1999).
3 Blundell and Robinson (1999) provide an extensive discussion on the prevalence and potential of such
arrangements in the economy.
4 The main proposal being that shareholders should be allowed to vote on the report of the remuneration
committee.  See the original discussion paper DTI (1999).
5 For an examination of the impact of this move to Ltips, see Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2001).
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In addition, remuneration committees are discouraged from permitting a second or further
chance  to meet the performance conditions (‘re-testing’) if they are not fully satisfied at
the first opportunity6.  Finally, the reward for the attainment of targets is encouraged to be
on a sliding scale ( where the reward or proportion of options vesting increases with the
level of performance once a certain threshold is surpassed).  In all of this, it should be
stressed that the actual ABI guidelines nowhere prescribe the behaviour of remuneration
committees.  Recommendations only are given7, exceptions are permitted, and
remuneration committees and boards are free to depart from these guidelines.
Emphasis is also placed on reporting to shareholders the expected value of such rewards.
This suggests a move away from the current practice of neither reporting8 nor recognising
the cost of servicing ESOs, a move which is wholly consistent with recent government
proposals to bring reporting of executive pay more in line with the SEC (1993)
regulations that apply in the USA.  This challenge does, of course, highlight the difficulty
of assessing the impact of the ABI guidelines on the pay-performance linkage confronting
the executives being remunerated under such schemes9.  There are sufficiently many
inter-related conditions suggested by the new ABI guidelines that the question of
evaluating their performance on the pay-performance rlationship looks intractable in
terms of a theoretical approach.  We are, therefore, forced to adopt a more empirical
method of estimation whereby various combinations of the guidelines are simulated on
data from a given set of companies.
This paper adopts an empirical approach to the study of the issues raised here, by
conducting several simulations of the implementation of these guidelines in a sample of
companies traded over a 14 year period on the London Stock Exchange.  The method
involves adopting various particular specifications of the guidelines and by applying them
in each company to a representative chief executive at the start of 1984 and computing
the reward that this person would earn under each specification as the 1984-1997 period
unfolds.  The fortunes of such representative executives in a sample of some 244
companies traded on the London Stock Market over the period is then used to produce an
average picture.  For each of the hypothetical company chief executives, the pay
performance correlation is analysed to produced a summary measure of how each
configuration of the guidelines fares.
In the following section of the paper, some background information is provided
concerning the development of the ABI guidelines over the years.  This is then followed
by a section which explains how the empirical data are constructed.  The next section
                                                          
6 Options typically vest after three years and the performance period is usually the most recent three or four-
year period.
7 This is seen, for example, in paragraph 2.1 of the Guidelines which states ‘Remuneration committees are
expected to have regard to these Guidelines in developing and implementing share incentive schemes.’
8 In fact, UITF (Abstract 10) of the Accounting Standards Board (1994) does require basic option-related
information to be reported in a footnote to the accounts.
9 For earlier work examining the pay-performance relationship brought about by executive share options,
see Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) and Yermak (1995).  And for a discussion of UK policy in this area, see
Main (1999).
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then presents an analysis of the results obtained and the papers ends by offering some
policy discussion in the light of the conclusions that can be drawn from these results.
2. Background to the ABI guidelines
In an attempt to foster the adoption of a more explicit culture of performance related pay
in the board room10, the government of the day introduced the concept of ‘approved share
option schemes’ under the Finance Act 1984.  Until this point, any gains from ESOs were
treated as income and taxed accordingly (up to a rather punitive top rate of 83% in early
1979).  Although the top rate of income tax was reduced to 60% in 1979, the prospect
held out by the Finance Act 1984 was that ESOs operating under certain restrictions
could have their gains taxed as capital gains (which then faced a more attractive 30% tax
rate).  The principal restriction imposed by the Inland Revenue, in order to limit the tax
expenditure implications of this concession, was that the face value (the exercise price
times the number of shares under option) of options issued under such schemes should be
limited to four times the annual emoluments of the relevant executive11.
With the vast majority of ESOs being serviced through shares by subscription (newly
issued shares) rather than by acquisition (open market purchase), and with shares by
subscription being neither recognised nor reported in the earnings statement, Institutional
shareholders were alarmed at the prospect of equity dilution12.  In drawing up a set of
guidelines, the ABI seems to have reached for the existing Inland Revenue Code.  The
ABI guidelines were almost universally adopted13, to the extent that it almost became a
rule or an entitlement that all executives at board room level would be issued with options
to the value of four times emoluments.  The fact that such a uniform distribution of ESOs
is unlikely to represent an efficient outcome in terms of providing individual executives
with the appropriate incentive - a situation that is likely to vary from company to
company and, indeed, executive to executive - was highlighted by Main (1994).
Admittedly, revised ABI guidelines subsequently included provision for so-called ‘super
options’ at eight times emoluments but the performance conditions14 were sufficiently
steep to deter most companies from using them.
                                                          
10 Performance related pay can be viewed as part of the contractual approach to corporate governance (see
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) for a more detailed review and
discussion).
11 There were also Inland revenue conditions requiring a minimum three year vesting period and a
maximum 10-year life.  Annual emoluments are roughly base pay plus bonus with an allowance for the cash
equivalent of benefits in kind.
12 One impact of the Greenbury and Hampel reports has been  a reversal of this pattern and an increased
propensity to use market purchases of share to meet vesting of awards under Ltips and ESOs.
13 Main (1993) provides a description of the organisational arrangements for pay setting in the board room.
14 These demanded a minimum vesting period of five years and growth in earnings per share that placed the
company in the upper quartile of the FTSE-100 performance.
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Although the intention of the ABI was always that their guidelines should be used by
boards and remuneration committees to guide their remuneration policy, a succession of
revisions (concerning issues such as the entitlement to reissue options within a ten year
period if a previous tranche had been exercised) resulted in these very ABI guidelines
effectively being used as the ‘rules’ by boards and remuneration committees.  This in
spite of the fact that any tax advantage gained by adhering to the original Inland Revenue
conditions for approval had to a large extent swept away with the Finance Act 1988
which not only reduced the top rate of income tax to 40% but harmonised the tax payer’s
capital gains tax with their marginal income tax rate15.  Only with the Greenbury Report
(1995) did the ABI guidelines lose their pre-eminence, and then only due to a movement
by companies toward Ltips and away from ESOs.  The latest ABI (2001) guidelines can
be seen as an attempt to include all share-based executive incentive schemes16, but it also
represents a marked departure from its previous implicit one-size-fits-all approach.
Companies are now free to issue options at some proportion of an executive’s base pay
and to do so on an annual basis.  In return, however, perhaps stung by the widespread past
criticisms of what are widely (but often incorrectly17) perceived to have been
unnecessarily generous ESOs, the ABI has included some strong encouragement toward
the inclusion of demanding performance criteria.  These criteria are required to be relative
to a peer group of companies or to some benchmark performance standard.
The salient aspects of the new guidelines are as follows:
(i) condones the move away from the traditional option scheme with its four times
emoluments limit towards phased grants - on an annual or some other regular basis:
(‘PHASING’).
(ii) the use of challenging performance criteria relative to an appropriately defined peer
group or other relevant benchmark, with total shareholder return being acceptable as the
primary criterion where it is supported by a defined secondary financial criterion,  e.g.
earnings per share .  Performance criteria should demand median level performance but
with a sliding scale towards superior performance: (‘RELPERF’).
(iii) a single predetermined performance measurement period is encouraged and the
ability to ‘retest’ performance over successive periods if performance originally falls
short is discouraged: (no ‘RETESTING’).
(iv) while the issuing of options with a strike price at a premium to the prevailing market
price is not accepted as a substitute for performance conditions, i.e. performance  hurdles,
it is mentioned: ‘PREMIUM’.
                                                          
15 The residual tax benefit lay in avoiding any tax until the underlying shares themselves were sold (as
opposed to the options being exercise) and the tax shield provided by the annual capital gains tax allowance
- something most senior executives are likely to have exhausted in any case).
16 And, indeed, in recent years there has also been a swing back to executive share options in preference to
the complexity of Ltips.
17  See Main, O'Reilly, and Crystal (1994) and Conyon and Murphy (2000) for some comparative evidence
on CEO pay.
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As indicated above, the new guidelines emphasise the importance of providing some
notion of the expected value of the awards granted from the outset.  Under the
UITF(Abstract 10) guidance of the Accounting Standards Board (1994), the annual
accounts are required to contain the basic information that might allow the calculation of
such values, but the reality is that the existence of performance conditions and other
restrictions ensure that only the most approximate of estimates can be made from these
data.
The main thrust of all of the regulations is investor protection through avoidance of
hidden liabilities in executive contracts and to ensure that the executive earns any shares
awarded.  No attempt is made in the UK to inhibit executives from counteracting the
incentive aspects of ESOs by taking a countervailing position in the company’s shares
through hedging in the derivatives market, although Company Law requirements on the
disclosure of contract for difference may effectively rule out such actions.  In the USA,
Schizer (1999) explains the general absence of such behaviour as a  generally accidental
outcome of the tax code.  Boards in the UK are, however, enjoined from reissuing options
that are ‘under water’, a practice that, nevertheless, Samuels and Lymer (1996)
documented18 in practice.
The following section of the paper explains the approach adopted here to gauge the
empirical impact of the guidelines sketched above for the connection between executive
pay and performance.  We also provide some information regarding the expected costs of
various aspects of the new guidelines.
3. Empirical Estimation
The Risk Measurement Services Data Archive between March 1984 and March 1997 is
used as the source of company observations.  To provide comparable data and to allow
the executive portfolios of share options to accumulate companies with a continuous
availability of share price, shareholder return and earnings per share data are selected.
This yields a sample of 244 companies.  Due to the data requirements imposed, there will,
of course, be a survivor bias in this sample and no claim can be made general
applicability of the levels of the pay-performance connection estimated.  Nevertheless, it
remains useful to study the relative impact of the changing versions of the ABI guidelines
on the pay-performance relationship in this sample.
In each case, the approach adopted is to follow a hypothetical Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) in each company over the entire period.  The CEO is assumed to receive £100,000
per annum in emoluments (in £1997) and for various combinations of the ABI guidelines
an ESO portfolio is accumulated and monitored over the period.  Clearly, for the first four
                                                          
18 It is interesting to note, in this context, that  recent work by Hall and Murphy (2000) demonstrates that
this can often be in the interest of both the company and the executive for such re-issues to take place.
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years the ESO scheme, portfolios simply accumulate, but thereafter it is possible to
generate measures of total remuneration as the various vintages of options conditionally
vest and are exercised according to the particular combination of ABI guidelines being
studied.  For each possible combination of guidelines, therefore, it is possible to generate
244 observations over some 10 years in terms of the pay outcome for the executives and
the respective performance of the companies involved.  Various descriptive and summary
statistics of the pay-performance relationship that emerged can then be studied.
As one of the key considerations in the ABI guidelines is the concept of relative
performance, it is also necessary to generate a performance bench mark.  The alternative
would have been to define a peer group for each of the companies and to measure each
company’s performance against its particular peer group.  This, however, would introduce
an additional degree of heterogeneity in an exercise that is attempting to reach some
general observations regarding the impact of the ABI guidelines.  It was, therefore,
decided to use common benchmarks for the two performance variables, total shareholder
return and growth in earnings per share.  Performance at the median and upper quartile of
the FTSE-100 companies is a widely used standard19.   This is available for the RMS data
base.  Before June 1986, however, there was no FTSE-100 marker and in its place
membership of the FTA Share Index is used.  But for the majority of the time period
under study, performance is measured relative to the median (for any vesting ) and the
upper quartile (for full vesting) of the FTSE-100.
As explained above, the main dimensions of ESO schemes examined include: the phasing
of option issue (‘PHASING’); the use of meaningful relative performance criteria
(‘RELPERF’); re-testing allowed of attainment of performance hurdles (‘RETESTING’);
options issued at a premium to the market (‘PREMIUM’); new issues of ESOs as and
when the CEO qualifies under any phasing condition (‘NEWISSUE’).  In each of these
scenarios, the year-to-year valuation of the outcomes is measured and, in addition, the
year-to-year variations in the executive’s wealth as measured by the Black-Scholes-
Merton valuation of the ESOs is calculated20.  The first approach presents an ex-post
view of remuneration, and the second an approximate accounting valuation of the
contemporaneous changes in CEO wealth over the period.
In total, there are six variations of ESO package design that are tested.  These are
delineated in Table 1.
                                                          
19 The use of the FTSE100 is becoming less popular than custom designed peer groups of comparator
companies.
20 The Black-Scholes-Merton valuation of executive share options has long been known to be at best a
crude approximation of the value to the executives, although slightly nearer the cost to the company (see
Clark and Main 1995, p. 66).
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Table 1
Basic Modes of ESO Investigated.
Characteristic Scheme Version Label
A B C D E F
PHASING No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RELPERF No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
RETESTING Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
PREMIUM No No No No Yes Yes
A: Base model (traditional 4 times emoluments ceiling)
B: Phasing of option issue (1 times emoluments annually).
C: Phasing of option issue (1 times emol. annually) plus Performance criteria.
D: As ‘C’ plus no Re-testing.
E: As ‘C’ plus Issue at a Premium.
F: As ‘C’ plus no Re-testing and Issue at a Premium .
There are, clearly, more than six combinations of the conditions listed above, but these
combinations seem the most obvious to test in terms of the pay-performance relationship
the various conditions produce.  In terms of the performance criteria, the options vest
(and are assumed to be immediately exercised) only after a minimum holding period of
four years.  This is longer than the usual official three-year condition, but the
complication of closed periods for director equity transactions and other institutional
features suggest that this is not too far from reality.  When relative performance
conditions apply, the vesting is dependent on the company in question attaining both: (i)
at least median performance on total shareholder return; and (ii) an annual growth in
earnings per share of retail price index plus three percentage points21 over the previous
three years.  The extent of the vesting is decided on a pro-rata basis22 with median total
shareholder return earning 0% of entitlement and upper quartile earning 100%.  For those
circumstances in which share options are issued at a premium exercise price, the premium
assumed is the current market price on the day of issue plus 25%.
4. Analysis of Results
Restricting the sample to non-financials, a total of 244 companies in the Risk
Measurement Services Data Archive are found to have complete data on share price,
                                                          
21 In recent practice, rpi+3%, or even rpi+4%, is not uncommon.
22 Although the actual guidelines refer to ‘sliding scales between top quartile and median performance’, the
initial reward at the median may start at 25% of possible shares rather than 0%, and the maximum 100%
vesting may occur at top quartile performance, thus resulting in performance-pay ‘flat-spots’.
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volatility, and earnings per share in the period 1984 through 1997.  A list of these
companies is given in Appendix A.  For each company, a representative Chief Executive
Officer is treated as having and annual base pay of £100,000 (in £1997).  This
simplification plays no role in the subsequent analysis, which focuses on the proportional
change in remuneration for change in company performance.  Starting in 1984 each
executive is followed through 1997 and, depending on the exact set of rules in place (see
Table 1), that executives qualification for share options is monitored and their options
holdings valued on a yearly basis with the appropriate exercises, lapses, and new issues
duly recorded.  The first four years of data are necessary to bring the executive’s into an
‘equilibrium’ state in terms of the option plans (as a three year minimum vesting period
produces an effective four year cycle on such schemes), and this leaves 10  years of data
for analysis.
Two pay variables are computed.  The first, labelled ‘Pay’, is simply the base pay plus











Pt  =  prevailing share price at time t
SPj = strike price of options issued at time j
NEXj,t is the number of share options of vintage j that are exercised in period t.
The second pay measure is more complex than the out-turn measure presented above.
This second measure, labelled ‘Pay2’, includes all the realised and unrealised gains to the
option holdings of the executive in the relevant year.  This is done by using a Black-
Scholes-Merton approach to place a crude market value on the option holdings of the
executive at each year-end in the history.  As discussed above, it is recognised that for
well-known reasons this can only be an approximation to the wealth enhancement of the
executive due to ESO holdings.  Most obviously, the change in wealth so measured
ignores the fact that the options being valued may not have vested, that the options cannot
be traded but only exercised by the nominated executive, and that there is an additional
risk owing to the chance of the executive being fired or the company being taken over23.
Thus ‘Pay2’ can be written:
                                                          
23  This is a much overstated problem as, in reality, most executives in a change of control situation or even
in a loss of job situation (e.g., if deemed a ‘good leaver’) are allowed to exercise their outstanding options -
often earlier than the original vesting requirements.
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Numberj,t = number of shares under option of vintage j that are held at period t.  This will
vary over time as some are exercised and some lapse, either due to time
limitations or due to failure to attain performance-criteria hurdles that are part of
the vesting requirements of the company’s executive share option plan.  For j = t,
these are new issues.  (Note that, for j ≠ t, Numberj,t is first reduced by NEXj,t ).
BSj,t  is the Black-Scholes valuation of an option on the company’s shares issued under
the company’s executive share option plan at time j and valued at time t, thus:
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N(d) is the cumulative normal distribution function.
T is the valid life remaining on he option.
σ  is the volatility of the share.
rf is the risk free rate.
rd is the dividend yield.
Table 2 provides a time series of the sample average for these two pay variables (‘Pay’
and ‘Pay2’) over the years 1988 through 1997 as estimated under the conditions of the
various sets of assumptions underlying the models, e.g., ‘Model A’ the raditional form of
non-phased 4-times-emoluments execuitve share option grant, with no performance
conditions.  It can be seen from the table that, even from this sample-average perspective
of executive pay, there is a substantial difference between the two measures of
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remuneration.  The movements in the measure ‘Pay2’ are more marked although less
extreme than those of ‘Pay’.  The data are plotted in Figure 1 for each of the 6 variations
of the model of executive remuneration.  These will be discussed at greater length below
when the connection with company performance is investigated.
Table 3 provides an initial comparison of the scheme type by presenting the distribution
of total pay over the 10 years and across the 244 companies under analysis.  The first
thing to note is that, at the end of the day and using the mean of total pay over the 10
years, the two pay measures are remarkably close.  This is exactly what is to be expected,
as they are measuring the same thing, albeit in different ways.  Pay gains ascribed to an
executive under the ‘Pay2’ measure are often reversed as the company’s performance
falters.  The ‘Pay’ measure, on the other hand, records only the actual gains realised (as
well as base pay).  As we shall see in Table 4, however, the measure ‘Pay2’ may do a
better job in terms of revealing the connection between the executive’s fortunes and those
of the company.  This is particularly clear in the cased of Model A, the traditional 1984-
type of scheme.  Here, the ‘Pay’ measure captures the realised gains, especially in 1988
resulting from the bull market of the late 1980s.  The ‘Pay2’ measure is more modest
because it allows for the price reversals and the price gains within a particular year.
The second point to note is that the exact design of the share option scheme has only a
modest impact on the average level of pay-out.  By imposing a condition of phasing
(Model B) does moderate the ‘Pay’ measure and the lumpy realisation of capital gains.
But imposing performance hurdles (Model C) has remarkably little impact.  As long as
re-testing of the performance hurdle is permitted, the executive is, on average, at little
disadvantage through having pay tied to company performance.  It is only with the
imposition of a no-retesting condition (Model D) that the recorded gains in remuneration
are moderated. Similarly, issuing share options at a premium to market (Model E) has a
proportional if modest effect on reducing total pay.  But, again, when a no-retesting
condition is imposed (as in Model F) remuneration levels fall to the lowest in the sample
of scheme designs.
Of course, parsimony in pay is one thing, but it may be a false economy if it is bought at
the price of a diminished pay-performance relationship.  It is to this that we now turn.
Taking one scheme type at a time, for each of the 244 sample companies a simple
regression is conducted using the 10 yearly observations (1988-97) of pay and total
shareholder return for that company.  Thus:
Pay RETt t t= + +α β ε (6)
The 244 estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity (β) so obtained for each scheme
describe the enhancement in the executive’s remuneration (£) for every percentage
increase in shareholder wealth.  The estimated coefficients are grouped as the lowest
10%, the lowest 25% (lower quartile), the middle 50% (inter-quartile range), the top 25%
(upper quartile) and the top 10%.  The average coefficient within each of these groups is
presented in Table 4.  The significance of the average β figure for group k is computed as
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Nk = the number of firms in the group k of firms
βi  = the regression coefficient estimated as in equation (6) for firm i
σi  = the standard error of coefficient βi in regression for firm i
Concentrating initially on the inter-quartile range values (Middle 50%), the first thing that
stands out in Table 4 is the marked difference between the results for the pay measure
‘Pay’ and the measure ‘Pay2’.  Coefficients in the lower part of Table 4 (‘Pay2’) are, in
general, several times larger than those in the upper part (‘Pay’).  For Model A the ratio is
over 10 and is at lest 4 times the outturn pay-performance measure (Pay) in the other
variants and almost seven times higher in the two models that do not allow retesting
(Models D and F), thus demonstrating the potential gains that are lost when a
performance hurdle is not attained.
It has already been established above (in Table 3) that these two variables capture much
the same the same thing over the lifetime of any share option scheme.  But the important
observation here is that, in terms of gauging the efficacy of a scheme in terms of tying pay
(‘remuneration’) to performance, the more time-sensitive measure ‘Pay2’, which utilises
the changing value of the executive’s share option portfolio by use of Black-Scholes
valuations, reveals to a fuller extent the degree to which the fortunes of an executive are
tied to the performance of the company.  This suggests that, in terms of ABI reporting and
communication with shareholders, the ‘Pay2’ measure may be the more obvious to use.
The problem with the more straightforward ‘Pay’ measure is that it lacks time-sensitivity,
as the realised option gains may occur substantially later than the performance that
merited the reward.
The second feature to emerge form Table 4 is the very different outcomes achieved by
different variants of executive share-option schemes.  In terms of establishing an
empirically strong connection between executive pay and firm performance, Model C
(phasing with performance hurdles but re-testing allowed) does best, both judged by the
middle 50% of companies (£4996 for the Pay2 measure) and by examining the more
extreme outcomes (£2769 for the lowest 10% and £8853 for the highest 10%).  Once the
re-testing facility is removed (in Models D and F) the pay-performance connection
becomes much weaker, falling for the middle 50% in terms of the Pay2 measure to £3085
and £2526 respectively.
In the context of reporting expected (and, indeed, out-turn) values of executive share
option schemes, it is interesting to recall the results presented in Table 3, which
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demonstrates that the total (or average) costs of these schemes varies relatively little over
models B, C and E.  Whether measured by the ‘Pay’ or the ‘Pay2’ measure the average
cost of these schemes is quite similar.  By restricting re-testing (Models D and F), the
overall costs can be reduced.  But, in these last two cases, the pay-performance
relationship is seriously weakened.  In a similar vein, it is interesting to note that issuing
options at a premium (or 25% to prevailing market price in the case of Model F) reduces
costs fairly proportionately, but also reduces the pay-performance relationship.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has detailed several aspects of the recent moves by the ABI to condition what
remuneration committees offer by way of executive share options.  There are many
motivations underlying these changes and we have focused on but one of them, namely
the impact on the pay-performance relationship between the executive and the firm.
What emerges in the results discussed above is that additional constraints, which attempt
to raise the performance standard by raising the hurdle, may indeed succeed in enhancing
the pay-performance connection.  It is, however, possible to be overly restrictive -
resulting in a hurdle that is set so high that few get over it, with the consequence that the
connection between pay and performance is actually diminished (for example, Model D
or Model F with no re-testing versus Model C).
In terms of effective communication with shareholders and other stakeholders, the very
different results obtained with remuneration measure ‘Pay’ versus the measure ‘Pay2’
serves to emphasise the advantage of portraying the impact of pay-performance devices in
a contemporaneous way, particularly as seen from the perspective of the executive.  Of
course, many of the ‘paper’ gains made and subsequently lost on an executive’s option
portfolio may well be discounted against this eventuality in the eyes of the executive, but
the important thing is to offer an alternative perspective from the narrow ex-post out-turn
option gains as included in the simple ‘Pay’ measure.  This commonly used measure
emphasises winners and fails to capture the ups and downs of executive share option
holding - far from a one-way bet when they represent foregone or deferred basic
remuneration.
Use of an evolving Black-Scholes method of valuing the executive’s portfolio of share
options, as in ‘Pay2, produces a clear and timely result.  Waiting to record the actual
exercise of options and the realised gains, as in ‘Pay’, will record the same transfer of
wealth form the shareholders to the executive, but it will be done in a way whereby the
timing obscures the true nature of the relationship.  On the other hand, as the ABI
guidelines (2001, Appendix 2) recognise, the existence of performance hurdles and re-
testing restrictions complicates the expected valuation of option grants.
From a policy perspective, it might be useful if the ABI and other involved parties could
recommend boards and remuneration committees to set performance conditions that are
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neither too easy nor to tough to achieve.  Excessive severity in management incentive
schemes is in no-one’s interest.  Furthermore, where performance conditions are set, they
should possibly be tempered with a measure of generosity in terms of re-testing and re-
issue of options24.
In terms of accounting policy, there also seems to be a case for heading the pleas of the
International Accounting Standards Board and encouraging the accounting profession to
start reporting and recognising the expense of executive share option schemes, using
methods that utilise Black-Scholes or some other market-equivalent based method of
option valuation.
Government policy in this area seems to be developing along the lines of allowing
shareholders to have a vote on the remuneration report25.  As can be seen from the
calculations above, such an arrangement will demand a considerable amount of
elucidation of the likely characteristics of the recommended remuneration policy.  Above
all, these circumstances will reward a considerable amount of simplicity and transparency
in the design of the remuneration scheme.
Finally, for boards and remuneration committees, the challenges are high and getting
higher, but so too are the stakes.  Increasing company performance through designing
executive remuneration packages may seem a rather indirect approach, but for the non-
executive members on the board it may offer the most effective route in the face of
bounded rationality and informational asymmetry.
                                                          
24 Although, this last plea regarding re-issue becomes irrelevant under the new guidelines where annual
issues of options are encouraged (as opposed to the previous reliance on a four-times-salary block issue).
25 See DTI Press Release on 19 October 2001.
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Appendix A
Names of Companies on the Study
Number LBS Code
1 4935 Adam & Harvey Group plc
2 44 Adwest Group plc
3 6255 Albert Fisher Group
4 101 Allied Colloids Group plc
5 98 Allied Domecq plc
6 118 Allied Textile Companies plc
7 152 Amber Industrial Holdings pl
8 6935 Amersham Intnl plc
9 6963 Antofagasta Holdings plc
10 304 API Group plc
11 9 APV plc
12 292 Asda Group plc
13 260 Ash & Lacy plc
14 286 Associated British Foods
15 359 Avon Rubber Co plc
16 753 B A T Industries plc
17 390 Baird(William) plc
18 6051 Banks (Sidney C)
19 447 Barr(A.G)& Co plc
20 465 Bass plc
21 486 Beales Hunter plc
22 6667 Bellway plc
23 561 Bertam Hldgs plc
24 576 Bibby(J)& Sons plc
25 599 Bisichi Mining
26 6104 Black Arrow Grp plc
27 603 Black(A & C)
28 604 Black(Peter)Hldgs
29 814 BOC Group
30 634 Bodycote International
31 6801 Bogod Group plc'A R V'
32 649 Booker plc
33 655 Boots Co plc
34 679 Bowthorpe plc
35 374 BPB plc
36 6802 Braime(TF&JH) 'A N.V'
37 698 Brammer plc
38 707 Breedon plc
39 721 Bridport-Gundry plc
40 763 British-Borneo Petroleum Syn
41 809 British Mohair Holdings
42 817 British Petroleum
43 4526 British Polythene Industries
44 844 British Vita plc
45 878 Brown(N) Group plc
46 896 Bryant Group plc
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47 832 BSS Group plc
48 836 BTP
49 367 BTR plc
50 922 Bullough plc
51 924 Bulmer(H P) Hldgs plc
52 927 Bunzl plc
53 938 Burmah Castrol plc
54 949 Burtonwood Brewery
55 6882 Cable & Wireless plc
56 985 Cadbury-Schweppes
57 1030 Canning(W) & Co plc
58 1049 Carclo Engineering Group
59 6868 Carlton Communications plc
60 6228 Chamberlain & Hill
61 1154 Charter plc'Reg'
62 6109 Chemring Group plc
63 6052 Christies Intnl plc
64 1189 Church & Co plc
65 1319 Concentric plc
66 3066 Cookson Group
67 1367 Cooper(Frederick) plc
68 1408 Courtaulds plc
69 6234 Cradley Group Hldgs plc
70 6653 CRH plc
71 1450 Croda International
72 1453 Cropper(James)Co.
73 1497 Dalgety plc
74 1529 Davis Service Group plc
75 1542 De La Rue Co plc
76 1555 Delta plc
77 1591 Dewhirst plc
78 1592 Dewhurst plc 'ANV'
79 1610 Dinkie Heel plc
80 1611 Diploma plc
81 1659 Dowding & Mills
82 6949 Druck Holdings plc
83 6867 EBC Group plc
84 1776 EIS Group plc
85 1778 Electrocomponents plc
86 1791 Ellis & Everard
87 5152 EMI Group plc
88 6555 Eurotherm plc
89 1467 Falcon Holdings plc
90 6009 Ferguson International Hldgs
91 6254 Fife Indmar plc
92 1946 Fine Art Developments
93 6981 FKI plc
94 2010 Forminster plc
95 6204 Friendly Hotels
96 2101 Garton Engineering
97 2108 Gaskell plc
98 2124 General Electric
99 2304 GKN
100 2160 Glaxo Wellcome plc
101 2162 Gleeson (M J) Grp plc
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102 2178 Glynwed Intl
103 2221 Grampian Holdings plc
104 2222 Granada Group plc
105 2227 Grand Metropolitan
106 6857 Graseby plc
107 2255 Greenalls Group plc
108 2257 Greene King plc
109 2307 Guinness plc
110 3316 Haden Maclellan Hldgs plc
111 2356 Halma Investments
112 2357 Halstead(James) Grp plc
113 2369 Hampson Industries plc
114 2381 Hanson plc
115 2389 Hardys & Hansons plc
116 6262 Harris (Philip) plc
117 2407 Harrisons & Crosfield plc
118 2432 Hawtin plc
119 6744 Haynes Publishing plc
120 2441 Hazlewood Foods plc
121 6519 Heath(Samuel) & Sons plc
122 2477 Hepworth
123 2491 Heywood Williams
124 2509 Highland Distilleries Co
125 2520 Hill & Smith Hldgs plc
126 6200 Holt (Joseph) plc
127 2624 Howden Group & Co
128 2650 Hunting plc
129 2679 IMI plc
130 6976 Intereurope Technlgy Svs plc
131 2810 Johnson Group Cleaners plc
132 2829 Jones,Stroud(Hldg)
133 2837 Jourdan (Thomas) plc
134 5719 Kingfisher plc
135 6058 Kwik-Fit Holdings plc
136 2987 Kwik Save Group
137 2998 Ladbroke Group plc
138 1019 Laird Group
139 3014 Lamont Holdings
140 3043 Laporte plc
141 3081 Leeds Group plc
142 1736 Linton Park plc
143 6028 Lookers plc
144 3261 Low & Bonar plc
145 6030 Macfarlane Group (Clans)
146 3373 Manders plc
147 3384 Mansfield Brewery plc
148 3400 Marks & Spencer
149 3419 Marston Thompson
150 1225 Matthew Clark plc
151 3447 Matthews(Bernard)
152 3313 McKechnie plc
153 3486 Menzies(J.)(Hldgs)
154 6840 Metal Bulletin plc
155 3507 Metalrax Grp plc
156 6955 Meyer International plc
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157 7004 Microgen Hldgs plc
158 6530 Molins plc
159 6035 More Group
160 3614 Morgan Crucible
161 3618 Morland plc
162 3626 Morrison(W) Supermkts plc
163 3632 Moss Bros Group plc
164 3683 Narborough Plantations
165 6296 Nichols(J N)(Vimto) plc
166 3808 Northern Foods
167 3986 Pearson plc
168 4002 Peninsular & Orient'Dfd'
169 4021 Perry Group plc
170 4050 Photo-Me Internatnl plc
171 4081 Plysu plc
172 6309 Pochin's plc
173 4103 Portsmouth & Sund. News
174 4106 Powell Duffryn plc
175 1915 Premier Farnell plc
176 6076 Pressac Hldgs plc
177 4204 Racal Electronics plc
178 4259 Reckitt & Colman plc
179 4268 Redland
180 4289 Reed International plc
181 4294 Relyon Group plc
182 4300 RENTOKIL INITIAL
183 4325 Ricardo Group plc
184 4256 RMC Group plc
185 6783 Rolfe & Nolan plc
186 4412 Rotork plc
187 6964 Rowe Evans Invests plc
188 4345 RTZ Corp plc 'Reg'
189 4440 Rugby Group plc
190 4447 Russell(Alexander) plc
191 1761 Safeway plc
192 6046 Sainsbury(J) plc
193 4519 Scapa Group plc
194 4561 Scottish & Newcastle
195 4583 Sears
196 4639 Senior Engineering
197 4659 Sharpe & Fisher plc
198 4676 Shell Trnspt&Trd'Regd'
199 4683 Shiloh plc
200 4699 Siebe plc
201 4730 Sirdar plc
202 4740 Slingsby(H.C)plc
203 4754 Smith &Nephew Assd
204 505 Smithkline Beecham plc
205 4763 Smiths Industries
206 6047 Smurfit(Jefferson) Ir
207 4836 Spirax-Sarco Engr.
208 4883 Staveley Inds plc
209 4911 Sterling Industries plc
210 4931 Stirling Group plc
211 6339 Swan (John) & Sons
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212 5061 Tate & Lyle plc
213 5077 Taylor Woodrow plc
214 5118 Tesco plc
215 6340 Thorpe (F.W.)
216 5255 TI Group plc
217 5162 Tilbury Douglas plc
218 5187 Tomkins plc
219 5188 Tomkinsons plc
220 5216 Transport Dev.Grp.
221 3154 Trinity Intnl Hldgs'LV'plc
222 6624 Ulster Television plc
223 5289 Unigate plc
224 5331 United News & Media plc
225 5388 Vaux Group plc
226 5472 Volex Group
227 5433 Waddington plc
228 5440 Wagon Industrial Hlds
229 5500 Watmoughs(Hldgs.)
230 5504 Watson & Philip
231 5505 Watts,Blake,Bearne
232 5524 Weir Group plc
233 5622 WF Electrical plc
234 4279 Whatman plc
235 5595 Whitbread plc
236 5666 Wilson(C.)Hldgs.
237 5694 Wolseley plc
238 5696 Wolstenholme Rink
239 5698 Wolverhampton & Dud Brew
240 6362 Wood(Arthur)& Son(Longport)
241 3607 Yorklyde plc
242 5755 Yorkshire Group plc
243 5760 Yule Catto & Co
244 5764 Zetters Group plc
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
(mean values by year by Model Version)
Year Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F
Pay Pay2 Pay Pay2 Pay Pay2 Pay Pay2 Pay Pay2 Pay Pay2
1988 597466    221674 224366 132645 190925 133524 190925 98893 180843 124832 180843 97698
1989 101956 165517 222838 213051 211671 228684 191679 181555 197788 207617 180846 168452
1990 100238 78686 149856 92547 143098 90484 129652 71750 135146 86104 123930 73837
1991 100056 104740 122494 125592 119476 137833 10942 111229 115060 125331 106627 106012
1992 207371 171759 129736 138024 124758 154158 110808 118727 119512 141549 108380 114401
1993 120311 149499 134940 172422 127578 217460 109224 146410 122603 191559 107353 134440
1994 129163 182122 170884 217561 158779 291297 120009 166611 150922 261902 116687 156251
1995 117054 88385 151164 98934 198367 65724 127629 75898 179129 62448 122133 77751
1996 220144 194173 168771 170323 202162 214637 138544 139947 187412 195069 132867 131867
1997 137958 126522 148471 133974 138237 128009 122083 107725 132534 123027 118836 108023
* ‘Pay’   is the value (£1997) of base pay plus all realised executive share option gains.
* * ‘Pay2’ is the value (£1997) of base pay plus all changes in the value of the holdings of executive share options.
Table 3
Present Value of Total Pay: Quartiles and Mean
(£1997)
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F
Lower-
quartile
2031000 1872300 1661300 1490600 1568600 1440000
Median 2368000 2086700 2041200 1704600 1910700 1624200
Upper-
quartile
2879500 2455900 2520600 2014700 2335700 1918900
MEAN 2535990 2202004 2168737 1838541 2043612 1766629
Lower-
quartile
1629700 1676300 1731300 1347400 1587300 1302000
Median 1904000 1925300 2126800 1539600 1924900 1458400
Upper-
quartile
2232700 2189300 2516800 1828300 2294400 1728100
MEAN 1994316 1999916 2215120 1632233 2025467 1564809
* ‘Pay’   is the present value (£1997) of base pay plus all realised executive share option gains.




 Regression Coefficients (t-statistics)
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•  Pay and Pay2 defined in footnote to Table 3.  Regresssion coefficients (b)  from a regression: Pay = a + b (Total shareholder return) + e
•  A:  Base model; B:  Phasing; C:  Phasing +Relative Performance; D: Phasing +Relative Performance + No Retesting; E:  Phasing +Relative Performance + Issue
at a Premium; F:  Phasing +Relative Performance + No Retesting + Issue at a Premium.
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